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Comparative Resources 
 
Continental Philosophy and Daoism 
STEVEN BURIK 
Abstract 
I argue that continental philosophical resources are more appropriate for com-
parative philosophy regarding classical Daoism since they in various ways chal-
lenge the dominant metaphysical orientation of Western thought and give us a 
better and more appropriate vocabulary to make sense of important Daoist ideas 
within the confines of Western languages. 
 Since classical Daoism is largely non-metaphysical or at least not metaphys-
ical in the same way as the Western history of philosophy is, it makes sense that 
those within the Western tradition who have sought to displace the dominant 
metaphysical tradition would be more in tune with such non-metaphysical con-
siderations. I focus on Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida and present three in-
terrelated areas of comparison with classical Daoism. First, I discuss the constant 
complication of any seriously dualist approach and with that the attempt to put 
humans in a constructive and primarily interdependent relationship with the rest 
of the world, which points to a form of process philosophy. Second, I focus on 
ideas regarding the use and limitations of language that both traditions display, 
and on the resulting efforts to understand language differently. Lastly, I present 
the decentering of the subject or the self is another feature prominent in both 
Daoism and the continental thinkers, although in different ways. 
 
Is it a coincidence that many comparative philosophers have employed 
the philosophies of continental thinkers in their efforts to understand 
and engage philosophies from other cultures? Or is there more to it? 
Many of the most influential comparative thinkers until today have at 
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least dabbled with continentals, or have been involved with them in 
some way even though continental thought was not their specialization.  
 Several comparative thinkers have employed continental ideas in 
relation to Chinese thought. First, there are the famous volumes, 
Heidegger and Asian Thought (1987) and Nietzsche and Asian Thought (1991), 
both edited by Graham Parkes, where well-regarded scholars explore the 
relations between Heidegger, Nietzsche, and various strands of Asian 
philosophies. A. C. Graham has employed the idea of deconstruction in 
Derrida, most importantly in Disputers of the Tao (1989). He notices pro-
found similarities: “The affinity of Laozi and Derrida is that both use 
reversal to deconstruct chains in which A is traditionally preferred to B, 
and in breaking down the dichotomy offer us a glimpse of another line 
which runs athwart it—for Laozi the Way, for Derrida the Trace” (1989, 
227, 323). 
 Furthermore, Hall and Ames, in their Anticipating China (1995), ar-
gue that the perspectivism in Nietzsche, the destruction inherent in 
Heidegger’s approach to ontology, and Derrida’s attacks on the meta-
physical language of presence are important contributions to under-
standing classical Chinese thought. As such, we can expect the language 
of these thinkers to be more conducive to conveying the intricacies of 
certain parts of classical Chinese thought. For example, they take Derri-
da’s notion of différance to be well suited to explain at least partly certain 
important language features of classical Chinese thought (1995, 228). 
James Sellmann observes that Zhuangzi’s approach shows affinity to the 
core of deconstruction, “drawing attention to the liminal concepts and 
propositions that support philosophical systems” (1998, 164). 
 Other prominent scholars have written about the affinity between 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida on one side, and classical Chinese 
thought, mainly in the form of Daoism, and Chan or Zen Buddhism on 
the other. While I realize that merely mentioning comparative scholars 
and their interest in continental thinkers does not constitute a special 
bond, I do indeed think that there is more to the connection. 
 One point of caution: it might also be the case that some continental 
philosophers are drawn to Daoism because of the fact that they find it 
easier to apply their ideas to it. In addition, there are even suggestions 
that thinkers such as Nietzsche and Heidegger may have—unwittingly 
or in full knowledge—appropriated key ideas of Chinese thought into 
20 / Journal of Daoist Studies 9 (2016)    
 
  
their own work. Reinhard May’s Heidegger’s Hidden Sources is a good ex-
ample.  
 Still, it may well turn out that continental philosophy is more con-
ducive to comparative thought than standard or traditional Western 
thought, which I conflate with and summarize under the term “meta-
physics.” My claim is that classical Daoism is largely non-metaphysical 
or at least not metaphysical in the same way as the Western history of 
philosophy is understood to be. If this is true, then it makes sense that 
those within the Western tradition who have sought to attack the domi-
nance of this version of metaphysics would be more in tune with such 
non-metaphysical considerations, and the most famous continental phi-
losophers in this attacking line are Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida.  
 In the following, I present three interrelated areas of comparison of 
their way of thinking with classical Daoism. First, there is the constant 
complication of any seriously dualist approach and with that the attempt 
to put humans in a constructive and primarily interdependent relation-
ship with the rest of the world, which points to a form of process philos-
ophy present in both traditions. Second, I focus on the ideas on the use 
and limitations of language that both traditions display, and on the re-
sulting efforts to understand language differently. Lastly, the decenter-
ing of the subject is another feature prominent in both Daoism and the 
continental thinkers, although in different ways. My focus will rest more 
heavily on Heidegger and Derrida, but I will show Nietzsche to have 
similar concerns in many areas. 
 
Complicating Dualism 
Thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida have spent consid-
erable time thinking through and attacking the dominant metaphysical 
position and its resultant dualistic character. There are of course many 
significant differences between the attempts at overcoming dualism from 
the Daoists and the continental thinkers. For example, Daoists never had 
to struggle against a dominant and exclusive metaphysics, or with its 
offspring in the form of creator-god religions, and consequently their 
approach to dualism is much more one of balancing than of overcoming.  
 In fact, as many scholars have pointed out, the only way to see Dao-
ism as non-metaphysical is in recognizing that it was not overly con-
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cerned with metaphysical issues in the first place (e.g., Hansen 2010). 
Nevertheless, I still think that the way of thinking behind both ways of 
doing philosophy is similar, and I will focus on these similarities. 
 Dualism is one of the defining features of most Western metaphysi-
cal philosophies,1 and as such does not fit well with Daoism, where dual-
ism is constantly complicated, denied, or given a different interpretation. 
The strength in recent continental philosophy lies in trying to undo the 
metaphysical emphasis on dualism by actively searching for different 
ways of thought, which compares well especially with Daoism. Compli-
cating dichotomies is what both post-modernism and Daoism do. The 
dominant Western metaphysical tradition is quite narrow-minded in that 
it sets rigid limits to what can be called philosophy and what not, and as 
such traditionally has conveniently identified Daoism as esoteric, mysti-
cal, primitive, or non-philosophy. 
 Instead, in recent continental thinking we find much more condu-
cive explorations of ideas of difference and sameness, which reveal an 
effort to bring back the correlativeness into thinking, as opposed to that 
kind of thinking that has been dominated for a long time by dualism and 
its forms of isolation and separation. The strategy used by most conti-
nental thinkers is a preliminary reversal of the hierarchy within dualistic 
pairs, followed by a complication of the dualism of the pair itself.  
 This seems to be the exact same strategy as classical Daoism em-
ploys. Graham has argued that whether or not dualism is a feature of 
thinking per se or not, it is still a fact that the standard form of Western 
dualism has tended to think in hierarchies and oppositions, with one 
                                                          
 1 The idea of metaphysics I use is narrow on purpose, and in line with Der-
rida, who defines metaphysics as “the enterprise of returning ‘strategically,’ ‘ide-
ally,’ to an origin or to a priority thought to be simple, intact, normal, pure, 
standard, self-identical, in order then to think in terms of derivation, complica-
tion, deterioration, accident, etc. All metaphysicians, from Plato to Rousseau, 
Descartes to Husserl, have proceeded this way, conceiving good to be before evil, 
the positive before the negative, the pure before the impure, the simple before 
the complex, the essential before the accidental, the imitated before the imitation, 
etc. And this is not just one metaphysical gesture among others; it is the meta-
physical exigency, that which has been the most constant, most profound and 
most potent” (1988, 236). There may be other forms of metaphysics, but I do not 
address those here. 
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side of any dualist pair establishing superiority or even annihilating the 
other, whereas classical Chinese philosophy has been more concerned 
with thinking of opposites as complementary ends of a spectrum (Gra-
ham 1989, 331-32). Let me continue by pointing to some examples where 
the continental thinkers complicate traditional dualism. 
 
Nietzsche 
Starting with Nietzsche’s work, we can say that it is mostly concerned 
with overturning the metaphysical tradition before him. Many of his 
themes are diatribes against dualism, often in the form of profound criti-
cisms of the ideas of objectivity and truth. Nietzsche’s skepticism and 
perspectivism are direct examples of this, since he recognized that to 
search for Truth with a capital T is futile, and thus the standard approach 
of metaphysics is denied. But Nietzsche goes further, since he does not 
provide a new truth or principle, but instead in his skepticism seeks to 
overcome that particular way of thinking in terms of truth so characteris-
tic of dualist metaphysics, for example in his idea of the Übermensch, 
which has been compared to either the sage (shengren) or the genuine 
person (zhenren) on numerous occasions.  
 The idea of the eternal return seeks to upset the alpha to omega lin-
earity of metaphysics. The death of god so famously proclaimed in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra is an obvious attempt to undo the dichotomy between 
this life and afterlife, with the further ideas of the immortal soul versus 
the mortal body and of the ideas or forms versus matter being compli-
cated as well. 
 On another level, both the overturning of values and Beyond Good 
and Evil seek to overcome the whole system of dualism altogether. The 
most obvious example here is found in Beyond Good and Evil, of which 
the title says enough, and where right in the beginning Nietzsche says 
that the “fundamental belief of metaphysicians is the belief in oppositions 
of values. . . . But we can doubt, first, whether opposites even exist and, 
second, whether the popular valuations and value oppositions that have 
earned the metaphysicians’ seal of approval might not only be fore-
ground appraisals” (Nietzsche 2002, 6).  
 In all these cases, Nietzsche starts with a reversal strategy, yet this is 
not so much to turn a given dichotomy around, but to overcome the di-
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chotomy as a whole. Moreover, Laozi and Zhuangzi are well known for 
employing reversal for the same strategic reasons. Laozi for example 
emphasizes the so-called yin qualities, but only as a strategic counterbal-
ance to the perceived dominance of the more yang, and in the end to 
come to the understanding that both are part of the workings of dao. 
 
Heidegger  
Next let us consider Heidegger’s aletheia as a possible other version of the 
idea of truth that the Daoist might find more palatable. Opposing the 
idea that “truth” is the correctness of our assertions, or the correspond-
ence of what we say with how the world is, Heidegger presents aletheia 
as the play between unconcealing and concealing, as the way in which 
the world operates. In Heidegger, unconcealing truth is always also con-
cealing, and the clear and distinct objective knowledge of things as they 
are is forever relegated and subsumed under the awareness of the inter-
play between concealing and unconcealing. The ground is reversed into 
the abyss (Ab-grund). As Heidegger puts it: “Truth is never only clearing, 
but also holds sway as sheltering-concealing, equally originally and in-
timately along with clearing. Both, clearing and sheltering-concealing, 
are not two but rather the essential swaying of the one, of truth itself” 
(1999, 244). 
 Similarly, in Daoism there is a distinct appreciation of the mystery 
or inaccessibility or ineffability of dao, or the way the world works. Dao 
always stays in the background, it never becomes present. For example, 
in Zhuangzi everything has its “this” and “that,” from one perspective 
things light up in a certain way, but this means that some other perspec-
tive or way that these things also are, gets obscured. Concealing and un-
concealing always go together, and there is no objective way to see 
things within this way of knowing and seeing things. Heidegger pro-
vides at least a better understanding of the unfolding of truth that would 
seem more in line with an understanding of dao as “the way things are.” 
 The Western notions of being and nothing are important in meta-
physical philosophy, and Graham was of course right to note that we 
should not conflate you and wu with any superficial likeness to being and 
nothing. However, we could ask ourselves if a comparison becomes 
more fruitful once the terms being and nothing get radically rethought, 
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as has happened in the case of Heidegger? Consider the following: “We 
have for a long time been accustomed to set being opposite becoming, as 
if becoming were a kind of nothingness and did not even belong to being; 
and this because being has for a long time been understood to be nothing 
else than sheer perdurance” (1975, 31). Here Heidegger tries to rethink 
the metaphysics behind the ontological presence. For him, being is no 
longer to be opposed to nothing or to becoming, but it is the whole pro-
cess of being that rather includes becoming and nothing. Absence and 
presence and growth and decay belong to the same process. 
 Here it would be instructive to consider Nietzsche’s affirmation of 
life. In Nietzsche’s notion of the eternal return, we find the similar idea 
that all is in continuous flux, and that this is something to be welcomed: 
“Everything goes, everything returns; eternally rolls the wheel of exist-
ence. Everything dies, everything blossoms forth again. . . . All things 
separate, all things again greet one another; eternally true to itself re-
mains the ring of existence” (1885, 232). 
 In Heidegger’s terms, such a process philosophy is stated in the fol-
lowing passage, where he talks about the “proper” understanding of 
being not as presence, but as lingering: “Whatever lingers awhile in 
presence comes to presence insofar as it lingers; all the while, emerging 
and passing away, and the jointure of the transition from approach and 
withdrawal, continue. This lingering endurance of the transition is the 
enjoined continuance of what is present. The enjoined continuance does 
not at all insist upon sheer persistence” (Heidegger 1975, 43-44).  
 Effectively seeking to destruct the metaphysical readings of eternal 
substance and presence, Heidegger succeeds in creating a way of think-
ing close to Daoism in its approach to change and transition from being 
to nothing, as he seems to understand these terms closer to the ideas of 
being present and being absent as part of the same process. While I am 
still uncertain whether this will give us a better approximation of the 
characters you and wu as used in Daoism, I firmly believe that this way of 
understanding being and nothing is much closer to the way Daoists 
think. 
 Related to this, Heidegger’s ontological difference may be consid-
ered a candidate for understanding what is meant by dao. Being is differ-
ent from beings, because being is not a being, but at the same time beings 
are. If being is thought not as a metaphysical principle, then understand-
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ing dao along such lines may be illuminating. Although I am definitely 
not suggesting that being and dao are in any way interchangeable, there 
is definite merit in employing the ontological difference in our quest to 
understand what is meant by dao in a Western language, even if this lan-
guage is Heideggerian. 
 
Derrida  
To illustrate the compatibility between Derrida and Daoism in this area I 
will focus on the notion of “trace.” Derrida employs many terms with 
regard to this trace thinking, which have definite parallels to dao, if read 
as way-making. In this context, “breaching” (Ger.: Bahnung; Fr.: frayage) 
is important in Derrida’s thought. “Spacing” and “supplement” are other 
terms that appear here.  
 In my view, these terms stand for the play of otherness, of differ-
ences, that which no longer belongs to presence, and has no real origin or 
source. Derrida calls this play of différance temporization (Derrida 1982, 
8), implicitly bringing attention to the deferral aspect of his thought. 
Presence is always deferred, traces are all we have. The trace for Derrida 
is that which is “[a]lways differing and deferring, the trace is never as it 
is in the presentation of itself. It erases itself in presenting itself, muffles 
itself in resonating…” (1982, 23). 
 Trace(s) are thus not to be understood as traces of some deeper 
origin behind their appearances: “The trace is not a presence but the 
simulacrum of a presence that dislocates itself, displaces itself, it proper-
ly has no site—erasure belongs to its structure” (1982, 24). The fact that 
différance is “the play which makes possible nominal effects, the relative-
ly unitary and atomic structures that are called names” (1982, 26) does 
not mean that there is something outside of this play that would function 
as a metaphysical guiding principle. The play is all there is. 
 Understanding dao in this manner it becomes impossible to see it as 
a metaphysical principle, since that already implies that there is some-
thing guiding something else, before something else, a presence before 
the trace. Consider the Daode jing: “Way-making [dao] is the flowing to-
gether of all things (ch. 63; Ames and Hall 2003, 173). This passage sug-
gests a process thinking comparable to Derrida’s trace: there is nothing 
behind the flowing together of things, meaning first that there is no guid-
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ing principle behind it, and second that all things flow together in the 
sense that they have traces in each other. There are only traces.  
 Other Daode jing passages can be read in a similar way. Chapter 1 
mentions that dao is ineffable, but this need not be because it would be 
some metaphysical principle, but because as the whole of everything 
flowing together, it cannot be given a name without reducing it to some-
thing within that flow. Chapters 4, 6, and 14 describe dao as elusive, as 
only seemingly there, validating the idea that there is no getting beyond 
the traces. Chapter 21 takes a similar position:  
 
As for the process of way-making,  
It is ever so indefinite and vague.  
Though vague and indefinite,  
There are images within it.  
Though indefinite and vague,  
There are events within it. (Ames and Hall 2003, 107)  
 
 A traditional metaphysical interpretation of this passage would 
suggest that behind the appearances, which are vague and indeterminate, 
there is a real presence, a sort of Platonic world of principles, forms, or 
ideas. Reading with Derrida, I see this passage as meaning that within 
context, only differences function and thus only traces are to be found. 
The context itself is nothing else than this play of differences, but within 
that context and arising out of context, there are indeed references or im-
ages. These references or images however never refer to that full pres-
ence suggested by the metaphysical tradition.  
 There is thus in Daoism a thoroughly contextual approach where 
everything is related and this-worldly. It is here where we can begin to 
appreciate the non-metaphysical approach in Daoism. For example, 
Zhuangzi, in Hansen’s words, “invokes no contrast between a world of 
appearance, a sensible world that is in flux, and a world of thought and 
reasons, and abstract unchanging one” (2010, 48). He also argues con-
vincingly that the mentions of a “true ruler” should not be read in a met-
aphysical way, but rather as skeptical assertions of the possibility of such 
a true ruler (2010, 42-44). The Zhuangzi states something comparable. 
Where everything has a “this” and a “that,” full presence is repudiated 
and the way is opened for an understanding that focuses on traces. As 
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Zhuangzi says: 
 
There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There 
is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is 
being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. 
There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Sud-
denly there is being and nonbeing. But between this being and nonbeing, I 
do not really know which is being and which is nonbeing. (ch. 2; Watson 
2003, 38)  
 
We can always take one further step, and as such any Truth with a capi-
tal T or dao will always be deferred. Traces are all that is left.  
 The play of yin and yang forces important in Daoism also suggests 
that otherness is always already there. Yin is always yin becoming yang, 
and vice versa. There is a continuous process; hence we cannot perceive 
things other than as infinite traces only identifiable within or through an 
ever increasing context. Before the beginning, there is another beginning, 
and so on. Thus beginning never really refers to some metaphysical prin-
ciple that started the process, but can only make sense from within the 
process. I see this also as corroborated by the birthing metaphors and the 
focus on generation within a system in the Laozi, rather than ideas of cre-
ation by some outside force. 
 Thought of in this way, outside and inside then become categories 
that are no longer strictly separable. Graham describes this thought in a 
persuasive manner: “Perhaps Laozi’s Way is how the Trace will look to 
us when we are no longer haunted by the ghost of that transcendent Re-
ality the death of which Derrida proclaims” (1989, 228).  
 
Knowing Process and Overcoming Dualism 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida challenge preconceived and domi-
nant notions of truth, reference, identity and wholeness or completeness, 
thus opening the way for new understandings of relationality and differ-
ence, which have strong connections to process philosophy where 
change is important and stability is relative. Instead of the usual meta-
physical attempt to halt the process, continental thought aims to show 
that this is not possible, nor desirable. It is of course true that the process 
thought present in pragmatism can capture some of this in a different 
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way, but it seems that this interplay of different particulars, this relation-
ality or interdependence, is more clearly brought out in continental 
thought. 
 Consider some of these examples: process philosophy is present in 
Heidegger’s Ereignis (event of appropriation) and in his concept of the 
Geviert (fourfold). Both actively seek to engage or rather reinstate hu-
mans within a configuration of the world, rather than to abstract them 
from it, as happens in the dualist metaphysical distinctions of sub-
ject/object, mind/body, form/matter. And such thought is present in the 
idea of being as becoming in Nietzsche, as well as in Derrida’s différance 
and trace thinking. Man is put back into the world, and the knowing of 
the subject becomes at best secondary to the knowing experience of con-
tinuity. In the case of Daoism we find a similar approach, as Hall and 
Ames put it: “Knowledge is always proximate as the condition of an ex-
perience rather than of an isolated experience. Situation has primacy, 
and agency is an abstraction from it” (1998, 220). 
 Zhuangzi similarly disparages conventional knowledge in favor of 
the kind of knowing that sees the self as one or continuous with the 
world. Knowledge (zhi) only arises when man artificially separates him-
self from the world, subject from object, mind from matter, and artificial-
ly creates distinctions between things at the price of the continuity or 
wholeness. Ames and Hall suggest that any form of philosophy that sees 
knowledge in this way, based on ontological presence, is not suited for 
understanding Daoism. 
 
Wuzhi . . .  actually means the absence of a certain kind of knowledge—the 
kind of knowledge that is dependent upon ontological presence: that is, the 
assumption that there is some unchanging reality behind appearance. 
Knowledge grounded in a denial of ontological presence involves acosmot-
ic thinking: the type of thinking that does not presuppose a single-ordered 
(“One behind the many”) world, and its intellectual accoutrements. It is, 
therefore, unprincipled knowing. (Ames and Hall 2003, 40) 
 
Then it would be the case that those ways of thinking that actively seek 
to attack that form of thought based on ontological presence would be 
more conducive to comparisons with Daoism, and this is exactly what 
continental philosophy is all about.  
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 We could relate this to Gelassenheit (releasement) and wuwei 無為 
(non-assertive action). Heidegger sees representational thought as 
wrongful abstractions, whereas the real way of knowing and being is 
found in Gelassenheit, which indicates a belonging to the earth in the con-
stellation of Geviert, connected to such ideas as Ereignis and entsprechen. 
Although at first Gelassenheit and wwei sound passive, a closer examina-
tion reveals that it is about undoing the dichotomy between passive and 
active, and according to Heidegger entails a “higher acting” (1966, 61). It 
is not just letting things be; this requires effort in an active opening up of 
your own thought structures, necessary for other ways of thinking to 
find an entrance.  
 Daoist thinkers similarly perceive this in terms of spontaneity and 
non-interference with the way the world is, using a terminology that 
seeks to express an attitude of openness and respectful responsiveness to 
the world, quite similar to what we also see in Heidegger and Derrida. 
Wuwei is not non-doing, but a certain kind of doing which seeks not to 
impose or interfere with the natural inclinations of things to be them-
selves. 
 Although Derrida has no term similar to Gelassenheit or wuwei, his 
thoughts on otherness could be instructive here. Without going into de-
tails, whenever Derrida talks about otherness, he insists that otherness is 
always already inserted into self or identity, but that traditionally, phi-
losophy as metaphysics has insisted on denying otherness in favor of 
self-sameness. In short, Derrida argues we must re-prepare to let the oth-
er come, because this other is not something we can summon in neither 
our language nor our conceptuality. Rather, it is something that has to 
come of its own, “[y]et it is necessary to prepare for it; to allow the com-
ing of the entirely other, passivity, a certain kind of resigned passivity 
for which everything comes down to the same, is not suitable. Letting 
the other come is not inertia ready for anything whatever” (2007, 39  
 In comparative philosophy, this injunction is of special importance. 
Comparative thinking must seek to find a way in which otherness can 
show itself as itself, but this is complicated immediately by the fact that 
other and self are always already inserted, and that we can only ap-
proach otherness from a certain perspective. This realization is what 
thinking along the lines of Heidegger and Derrida seek to convey, and 
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can then be used to understand ideas as spontaneity and non-assertive 
action. 
 Another similarity in relation to dualism lies in the denial of the 
importance of transcendence or a creator or higher principle for both 
continental thinking and Daoism. Ames and Hall have argued for the 
absence of any real importance of transcendence or creator gods at 
length. Heidegger and Nietzsche employ a similar strategy: they do not 
deny that there may be gods, but they definitely deny that such gods 
should have any import on thinking. Gods are mentioned in Daoism, but 
play no important role in the way of thought and life proposed by either 
Laozi or Zhuangzi. And of course both Heidegger and Nietzsche have 
argued that bringing gods into philosophy, or rather bringing religion 
into philosophy, is the worst one can do. A system of thought, or a phi-
losophy, should be enough by itself, and need not have recourse to out-
side transcendental principles, especially not in the form of gods. 
 Whenever gods do enter thought, they appear as intimately con-
nected to this world, in fact as not apart from it. Heidegger understands 
the Geviert as heaven and earth and man in one. Zhuangzi relates a simi-
lar understanding when he has Lao Dan describe the interchanges be-
tween yin and yang, heaven and earth and all the myriad things rising, 
transforming and decaying, and then ask: “What else but this is the An-
cestor from which we descend?” (Graham 2001, 130). The ancestor is not 
something different from the process; it is the continuous process of gen-
eration. 
 The last similarity to do with dualism lies in Heidegger’s thoughts 
about the same and the identical (das Selbe and das Gleiche). We should 
avoid trying to make things identical (what Heidegger calls das Gleiche), 
but we should treat them as being similar in a different way, which 
translates Heidegger’s notion “the same” (das Selbe). As he says: “But the 
same is not the merely identical. In the merely identical, the difference 
disappears. In the same the difference appears” (1969, 45). It is vital to be 
clear on the difference between the same and the identical. The same is 
not a metaphysical construct; it is not an overarching concept, but only 
functions because of difference. Heidegger says:  
 
The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent 
oneness of what is merely identical. The equal or identical always moves 
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toward the absence of difference, so that everything may be reduced to a 
common denominator. The same, by contrast, is the belonging together of 
what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say 
the same if we think difference. (1971, 216)  
 
 The identical then is part of a typical metaphysical striving for iden-
tity, generalization, and unity. Things that are the same should not be 
forced to become identical. Sameness only exists as a function of differ-
ence. Differences, or the play of differences, must be understood as the 
more originary. 
 How does all this overcome dualism? One would think Heidegger 
looks like a proponent of dualism here. Yet, on closer inspection, it is the 
tendency of metaphysical dualism to “reduce all differences to a com-
mon denominator,” to deny diversity by appealing to a higher, unitary 
principle. Instead, giving diversity, difference, room, is part of a kind of 
thinking that is indeed plural but not hierarchical or oppositional in du-
alist fashion.  
 Zhuangzi observes that “the wisest, because they have a full view of 
far and near, do not belittle the smaller or make much of the greater, 
knowing that measuring has no limit” (ch. 17; Graham 2001, 145-46). The 
sages see all things as the same, and with Heidegger, we can now see 
that this does not reduce those things to a oneness, but rather to a conti-
nuity in the sense of a belonging together. Ames and Hall mention that 
in Daoist philosophy, in the absence of a One-behind-the-many-
metaphysics, “difference is prior to identifiable similarities” (2003, 14), 
but such differences are only in an intimate relationship. For example, in 
the Daode jing, “determinacy (you) and indeterminacy (wu) give rise to 
each other” (2003, 80). “Grasping oneness,” for example, in chapters 10 
and 22, lies in acknowledging the interminable interplay of differences so 
pervasive in Daoism. Even the oneness in chapter 42 can be understood 
as the continuous harmonizing of yin and yang, and needs not be under-
stood as a reduction to oneness in the sense of identity or unity. 
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The Use and Limits of Language 
So far we can say that in its efforts to overcome dualism continental phi-
losophy has been forging new paths of inquiry, opening up new avenues 
of thought and re-connecting what may seem to be separate identities. In 
this attempt the continental thinkers have found themselves struggling 
with the language of metaphysics as well. Continental philosophy has 
challenged the metaphysical language of presence in many ways. Nie-
tzsche pointed out long ago that language and culture have much to do 
with each other, and that the metaphysical system owes much to the 
possibilities and employment of language. 
 
Where there is an affinity of languages, then because of the common phi-
losophy of grammar (I mean: due to the unconscious domination and direc-
tion through similar grammatical functions), it is obvious that everything 
lies ready from the very start for a similar development and sequence of 
philosophical systems; on the other hand, the way seems as good as 
blocked for certain other possibilities of interpreting the world. (2002, 20) 
 
 The Sapir-Whorf thesis on linguistic relativism, too, supports such 
ideas. Thus that Zarathustra can say, “New paths do I thread, a new 
speech comes to me; tired have I become—like all creators—of the old 
tongues” (Nietzsche 1886, 82). The “old tongues” of Western thinking are 
metaphysical to the core, and since metaphysical languages are represen-
tational, in general they do not provide a good match for the worldview 
of classical Daoism. Continental philosophy opens up not only possible 
equivalents or similarities to Daoist thought, by rethinking language it 
also opens up the space between them in a different way. For that space 
to get actualized, new ways of understanding and using language are 
needed. 
 Many scholars have already argued that the classical Chinese lan-
guage is substantially different from Western languages, and that this 
difference results in important differences in doing philosophy. In mul-
tiple ways, comparative scholars have acknowledged that the efforts of 
continental philosophy here might have some benefit to bring to com-
parative philosophy. As Hall and Ames have it, “The movement from 
representational to non-representational understandings of knowledge 
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and truth might well provide an appropriate bridge to the consideration 
of classical Chinese sensibilities on these topics” (1998, 144).  
 Derrida has said something similar. In his work, Of Grammatology, 
he argues, “Logocentrism is an ethnocentric metaphysics. It is related to 
the history of the West” (1976, 79). Later, he hypothesizes that we have in 
the classical Chinese language “the testimony of a powerful movement 
of civilization developing outside of all logocentrism” (1976, 90).  
 The idea of non-phonetic writing, or at least of a non-phonetic mo-
ment or movement in writing, which Derrida saw present in the Chinese 
language, is important since it “menaces substantiality, that other meta-
physical name of presence and of ousia. First in the form of the substan-
tive. Nonphonetic writing breaks the noun apart. It describes relations 
and not appellations” (1976, 26). The menace to substantiality and pres-
ence lies in the fact that systems of language are not closed to change. 
Hansen has argued that Daoism, and especially Zhuangzi, were well 
aware of the provisionality of language systems. “There is nothing ulti-
mate or constant in such systems. And, as the Laozi points out, the reason 
no such discourse is constant is that language (names) is inconstant—
artificial, conventional, changeable. No dao is constant because no name 
is constant” (Hansen 2010, 36).  
 Overall, we can say that metaphysical language has limited possibil-
ities, and that seeing language differently may indeed be conducive for 
understanding how the Daoists saw things differently, and thus ex-
pressed them differently. 
 
A Different Approach  
In the case of continental philosophy, the most important strategy used 
is what I would call the stretching of language, which includes the for-
mulation of neologisms and the twisting of grammatical functions. In 
Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida this becomes the way they try to open 
up thought structures that are otherwise too embedded within the West-
ern metaphysical history.  
 According to Nietzsche, language in general, and especially meta-
physical language, is not up to the task of showing us the process charac-
ter of the world. “Linguistic means of expression are useless for express-
ing becoming; it accords with our inevitable need to preserve ourselves 
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to posit a crude world of stability, of things” (1967, 380). Highly suspi-
cious of language as this metaphysical stability generator, Nietzsche says 
that it can nevertheless be used in new ways: “it is enough to create new 
names and estimations and probabilities in order to create in the long 
run new things” (1974, 122). Far from discarding language, which he sees 
as metaphorical in its core, Nietzsche urges us to accept the inherently 
metaphorical nature of language, and to create new metaphors and to 
use language freely, as he himself consequently does. 
 Perhaps the most profound attempt at using language differently 
lies in Heidegger. He uses language in various ways to overcome the 
shortcomings of metaphysical language, and was in these endeavors 
most certainly inspired in some way by Eastern thought, and mostly by 
Laozi and Zhuangzi. From his ideas of Geviert to Ereignis, from crossing 
out being or writing it as beyng, Heidegger did explore all the richness of 
language at his disposal. But also in his appropriation and retranslation 
or reinterpretation of the ancient Greeks, etymologically rigorous, but 
also challengingly difficult, Heidegger used language to point to a dif-
ferent way of thinking. 
 With his free use of language also came the realization that there 
were things that cannot be said, the shortcomings of language are inher-
ent and point us to the openness to mystery. “That the essential sway of 
be-ing is never definitely sayable does not indicate a lack. On the contra-
ry, it indicates that the non-definite knowing precisely holds fast the 
abground of, and thus the essential sway of, be-ing” (1999, 324). The mys-
tery of the abyss (Abgrund) is not to be feared, but embraced. Just as 
much as dao cannot be spoken, since it is the whole of the ten thousand 
things flowing together, being must be crossed out or it will be perceived 
as a being. 
 One of the most pertinent examples of Heidegger’s more daring 
exploits of language conducive to understanding Daoism appears in his 
verbalization of nouns. Phrases such as Das Ding dingt, the Welt weltet, 
explore the process character through the shortcomings of metaphysical 
language. Heidegger means with this that there is nothing behind the 
process of things thinging or of the world worlding.  
 This understanding is prevalent in Chinese philosophy in general. 
For example, in Confucius we find the idea of the father fathering, the 
son sonning etc. And according to Hall and Ames, classical “Chinese 
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language is not logocentric. Words do not name essences. Rather, they 
indicate always-transitory processes and events. It is important, there-
fore, to stress the gerundative character of the language. The language of 
process is vague, allusive, and suggestive” (2001, 16). Graham, too, 
makes this point (1989, 227). 
 This can be used to help understand that dao is nothing other than 
wanwu. Way-making is the myriad things thinging. Heidegger argues 
extensively in Das Ding that the true nature of thinging lies in the four-
fold, and “stays earth and sky, divinities and mortals. Staying [ver-
weilend], the thing brings the four, in their remoteness, near to one anoth-
er” (1971, 175). Further on, he puts the interplay in this way: “None of 
the four insists on its own separate particularity. Rather, each is expro-
priated, within their mutual appropriation, into its own being. This ex-
propriative appropriating is the mirror-play of the fourfold” (1971, 177).  
 Then he mentions that “in the strict sense of the German word bed-
ingt, we are the be-thinged, the conditioned ones. We have left behind us 
the presumption of all unconditionedness [unbedingt]” (1971, 178-79). His 
play with language reveals our interdependence, or relationality, in a 
profound way. Dao is nothing other than the interplay of all things or 
processed, but at the same time this interplay is what keeps everything 
hanging together. In their thinging, all things connect and bring together 
the larger whole. 
 Much can, and has been said, against Nietzsche’s aphoristic way of 
writing, Heidegger’s dense jargon, and Derrida’s playful style, to the 
extent that they have been accused of not being real philosophers, since 
they do not play by the rules and are too vague, allusive, and suggestive. 
Still, I think that this is exactly what puts such thinkers as Nietzsche, 
Heidegger, and Derrida into the nearness of Daoism. I do not mean to 
say that Daoism is therefore not philosophy and is not rigorous, but I 
state that the dominant metaphysical tradition is too narrow-minded in 
its thinking and thus or because of that in its language is not able to do 
justice to the richness of Daoist thought. Perhaps it is exactly in the 
stretching of language, and in the search for forgotten or new ways of 
meaning, that comparative philosophy finds its place.  
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Translation and Enlarging the Discourse 
Although both Nietzsche and Heidegger have written about translation, 
here I only work on Derrida to explain how the continental thinkers 
think about turning different kinds of thinking into Western discourse. 
Derrida’s impact lies in the realization that meaning is never pure; it is 
influenced or contaminated by language. In the words of Zhuangzi, as 
soon as we start making discriminations, something is inevitable lost. 
 Relating this to the practice of translation, an ever important topic 
for comparative philosophy, Derrida denies the possibility of the ulti-
mate goal of translation. He notes that he does “not believe that transla-
tion is a secondary and derived event in relation to an original language 
or text” (in Wood and Bernasconi 1988, 5). By questioning the status of 
what is traditionally seen as the original text, Derrida does not deny that 
there is a text translated or transformed into another, but questions the 
idea that the original means anything outside of or without its ever ex-
panding context, which consists precisely of its interpretations and trans-
lations. What he calls the demand of the original for translation may well 
be the inevitable and continuing Wirkungsgeschichte of the original. Der-
rida challenges the fullness or purity of any identity (the text to be trans-
lated), and rather understands identity as relative to difference and in-
terpretation (the text translated) and as such, living.  
 A serious problem in comparative philosophy is not only that trans-
lation is always transformation or interpretation, but that this interpreta-
tion “does not begin . . . with what is commonly called translation. It be-
gins as soon as a certain type of reading of the original text is instituted” 
(Derrida 2004, 19; italics added). Consulting Derrida’s work on transla-
tion, we may make more sense of the fact that there is really no one 
meaning to any original Daoist work. Meaning only arises out of inter-
pretations, something which the actual Wirkungsgeschichte or evolution of 
the Daoist texts through their commentaries and interpretations endorses. 
 I suggest that one of the functions of comparative philosophy is 
similar in that in and through its comparisons, it questions standard (or 
instituted) conceptions, interpretations, and explanations. Traditional 
Western metaphysics typically offers those from a place between differ-
ent philosophical traditions. This means first that culturally different 
paradigms of thinking need to be confident that their ideas will not be 
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appropriated by comparative philosophy, since that is what has usually 
been instituted as our normal type of reading. It also means that the rela-
tionality between different philosophical traditions must be reconsidered.  
 As regards this second point, Derrida explains the contextuality or 
relationality inherent in his thought by saying “that nothing exists out-
side context . . ., but also that the limit of the frame or the border of the 
context always entails a clause of non-closure. The outside penetrates 
and thus determines the inside” (1988, 152-53). Context itself is not only 
constitutive of any identity, yet it can never be closed off: it is structural-
ly and inherently open. Naming it the context would even be wrong, as 
this could still suggest a closed context with an identifiable content. Simi-
larly, translating dao as “the Way” ignores the fact that dao is largely pro-
cessual, and in a way it is similar to context, of which Derrida says it is 
nothing more or less than “the entire real-history-of-the-world” (1988, 
136). In this regard, dao is like context: “Way-making [dao] is the flowing 
together of all things” (Daode jing 62; Hall and Ames 2003, 173),  
 When comparative philosophy is not well served by referring to the 
metaphysical conceptual frameworks, it is necessary to enlarge the phil-
osophical discourse. Derrida is interested in liberating thinking from 
what has become the too stringent metaphysical and analytical philoso-
phy. He cares about “a thinking, let’s say, that is not confined within the 
particular way of thinking that is philosophy or science. There are 
forms, . . . there are perhaps pensées that are more thinking than this kind 
of thinking called philosophy” (1995, 202). 
 This move reminds us of Heidegger’s statement that there might be 
“greater thinkers” (1963, 24) outside of Western philosophy. Derrida’s 
deconstructions entail a thinking which is no longer purely philosophical, 
or it is differently philosophical, in that it questions the traditionally 
philosophical from various standpoints which are themselves not neces-
sarily philosophical in the traditional sense. Such deconstructions are 
“perhaps no longer scientific or philosophical, in the sense in which 
these words can be determined today. It is in fact this indetermination 
and this very opening that we designate . . . by the word ‘thinking’” 
(2004, 202-03).  
 Like Derrida, the strategic provocations employed by Zhuangzi are 
not about the total meaninglessness of words but about the mistake of 
assigning dogmatically fixed meanings. Essentially, both Derrida and 
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Zhuangzi are aware that there is no way they can ever permanently es-
cape the workings of language, and they accordingly challenge the in-
flexibility or determinateness of the ways of thinking in which they were 
brought up. It is not language per se that they are against, it is the abso-
lutist way in which it gets interpreted and used. They wish to replace it 
with a sense of indetermination. Such indetermination sounds challeng-
ing to us since through our languages we have become so accustomed to 
our metaphysical heritage, that it is very hard to even conceive of pro-
foundly different ways of thinking, especially ways of thinking that 
would like to leave certain things open. 
 
Style 
All this goes to say that a way of thinking and a language have much in 
common. Ever since Sapir-Whorf some version of linguistic relativism is 
plausible. It stands to logic then that not only would critics of the domi-
nant way of thinking seek to stretch language to try to think differently, 
they would naturally also change style. Indeed, this is what we see in 
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, and Daoism (especially Zhuangzi).  
 Nietzsche has a major influence in the area of language use. Not 
necessarily known as an inventor of new words, he was nevertheless 
profoundly different in his writings, and knew well how style and con-
tent go together (e.g., 2002, 29-30). As such, he did not really argue in the 
same way as philosophers had done, but pointed very much to philoso-
phy’s shortcomings and mocked existing morality and culture. Nietzsche 
recognized that in order to be effective in this endeavour, he needed to 
have a style to match. 
 We thus see a blending and appreciation of the literary aspects of 
philosophy more in these continental thinkers. Such is present in 
Heidegger’s ruminations on thinking and poetry, and in his later, medi-
tative thinking and writing, and are part and parcel of Derrida’s work 
and its playful, but incredibly dense style, as well as Nietzsche’s highly 
metaphoric and narrative style and his briefness or aphoristic language.  
 The play with words that characterizes especially Zhuangzi is 
matched in Derrida. Both display a great awareness of the provisionality 
of language. Mark Berkson has argued that this kind of language use 
points to an apophatic or denying intention. Examples include 
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Heidegger’s crossing out of being, Derrida’s “under erasure,” Zhuang-
zi’s turning his attacks on himself, Nietzsche’s awareness of the futility 
or the perspective nature of his own attempts, and Laozi’s admission 
that dao cannot be spoken about while yet writing a book about it. All 
these point to two things: direct or representational language is impossi-
ble, and the way things then are said has to be different. Berkson argues 
convincingly that the language use of Derrida and Zhuangzi—but we 
could extend that to the other thinkers—aims at forming a pact with the 
reader, and thereby inviting the reader to do more than just read, but to 
become involved on many other levels through and by the text (1996, 
109-13).  
 To read the continentals and Daoism is very much an aesthetic ex-
perience. For example, by letting words explode against each other, by 
exploiting the fullest range of meanings of any term, by bringing out 
ambiguities and inconsistencies, Zhuangzi and Derrida show us how 
language is not up to the promise of pure medium. We are trapped in a 
way because we have to use language, meaning we are always in a web 
of signification and can only operate from within this web. This is some-
thing the classical Chinese philosophical tradition was aware of much 
earlier than that of the West. However, if this is understood as possibility, 
then Heidegger, Derrida and Daoism advocate a use of language that 
seeks to explore it to its fullest possibilities, and this with full awareness 
of its dangers and limitations, rather than discard it. Again as Graham 
puts it, speaking of Zhuangzi (but the passage could equally well apply 
to Derrida or Nietzsche):  
 
In one of his many aspects he is himself a true sophist, fascinated by the 
subversion of received opinions and intoxicated by the plunge which im-
perils rationality in the course of discovering its possibilities. He is also, 
even in the flow of reason itself, a poet who changes course as new insights 
explode, elliptical even when most logical. One of his persisting thoughts is 
that in accepting what fits in with one’s ideas as ‘this’ and rejecting what 
does not, analytic thinking lights up only a lesser whole around the thinker 
and casts the rest into darkness. (1989, 178) 
 
Yet it is also to be said that both the continental thinkers and Daoists are 
aware that this is somewhat inevitable, and that language style thus 
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needs to change. In Graham’s words, as he says about Laozi and Derrida: 
“Both use a language which already escapes the opposition logic and 
poetry, a language in which contradictory statements do not cancel out, 
because if made in the appropriate sequence or combination they set you 
in the true direction” (1989, 227).  
 A different style is used to set the reader in a different way, to entice 
her into a different style of thinking. Great emphasis is also put on the 
idea of silence as conveyor or thought. That of which one cannot speak 
in any style, one should be silent about. Yet although we know language 
is artificial and that silence is better, we must overcome even this dichot-
omy in a thoughtful saying aware of its own shortcomings. “In what is 
neither speech nor silence may discussion find its ultimate” (Graham 
2001, 153). “Where can I find a man who has forgotten words so I can 
have a word with him?” (Watson 2003, 141). Or in the words of 
Heidegger: “The truly fateful encounter with historic language is a silent 
event [Ereignis]. But in it the destiny of being speaks” (1975, 57).  
 
Criticism of the Self 
Although there are perceived similarities between continental and Daoist 
thought, the cultural and philosophical environments in which these 
similarities arose are vastly different. Daoists never had to agitate against 
a system that isolates subject from object, self from other, agent from ac-
tion, and mind from matter. They never needed to undo such strict no-
tions of self, agent, or person. Continental thinkers, on the other hand, 
worked hard to overcome the metaphysical dominance in this area.  
 It may well be that the typically modern Western notions of self or 
identity do not feature in any prominent way in classical Chinese 
thought. It is certainly quite realistic to say that something like the Sub-
ject-Object distinction was not really present in Daoism. I will therefore 
use the terms “self,” “subject,” and “personhood” with some license and 
without making the finer distinctions between them only made in mod-
ern Western metaphysics. Despite these cautions and divergences, the 
end result conceptions of what a person or self is are remarkably similar, 
and lie again in the similar tendency not to abstract the particular from 
the totality. 
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 Next, I must admit that most of Nietzsche’s thoughts regarding the 
self or person do not really fit in well with what the Daoist sage should 
be. Nietzsche was passionate about the strong and noble person who 
exerted the will to power, and he seems to have had little respect or af-
fection for the person as embedded within a tradition. But that may have 
had to do more with his particular tradition, which he saw as degenerate. 
Nevertheless, to compare the Übermensch with the Daoist sage in terms of 
self or person, as has been done, would be pushing it on many levels. For 
one, although both the Übermensch and the Daoist sage share a certain 
strength of character, the way they use it is vastly different.  
 Where Nietzsche’s Übermensch sets out to assert power and control, 
and makes much of solitude, we obviously do not find such intentions 
with the Daoist sage of Zhuangzi, although there may be something to 
be said for it in Laozi’s ruler. Yet there are some similarities that surface 
in Nietzsche’s understanding of the self. In the Zarathustra, Nietzsche 
argues that the self is not the mind or some abstract thing, but resides in, 
or rather is, the body (1886, 29-30). But I confess that this is where in this 
case the similarities seem to end. Nietzsche is evidently against the yield-
ing and non-interfering attitude of the Daoist. But he nevertheless does 
have interesting criticisms on the metaphysical conception of the self, so 
his thoughts may be useful there. 
 
Resituating the Self 
There are many suggestions that the relation of self to otherness that 
prevails in metaphysics is in dire need of rethinking, and again, this is 
what continental philosophy has primarily focused on. The dualist ap-
proach has it that the self or subject is isolated or abstracted from its 
world, and that the true or real self, subject or identity lies exactly in this 
abstraction. Retraceable to a large extent to Descartes’s cogito, the meta-
physical tradition sees the self as an abstract entity, both separate from 
the world and self-sufficient, and as an enduring, non-physical substance 
behind the changing external world. In this sense the metaphysical idea 
of the self is a perfect example of the ‘one behind the many’ approach. 
But such a view is highly artificial, and underscores again the abstracting 
tendencies of the metaphysical tradition. But the continental thinkers 
have criticised this belief in such a self or subjectivity in many ways. 
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 Subsequently, because they criticize the metaphysical idea of self, 
continental thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida are fre-
quently accused of attempting a nihilistic eradication of concepts such as 
self, identity, or subject. This is patently false. What they do want to 
highlight is that the traditional metaphysical understanding of these 
concepts is in need of serious revision. In Derrida’s words,  
 
To deconstruct the subject does not mean to deny its existence. There are 
subjects, ‘operations’ or ‘effects’ [effets] of subjectivity. This is an incontro-
vertible fact. To acknowledge this does not mean, however, that the subject 
is what it says it is. The subject is not some meta-linguistic substance or 
identity, some pure cogito of self-presence; it is always inscribed in lan-
guage. My work does not, therefore, destroy the subject; it simply tries to 
resituate it. (in Kearney 1984, 125) 
 
The continental thinkers definitely do not want to give up on the idea of 
self or identity, but to reinvestigate how a self is produced or formed. 
There is a similar perspective in classical Chinese thinking. For example, 
Youru Wang states that Zhuangzi’s “forgetting” of the self  
 
plays at the boundary between self and non-self. While it transcends the 
closure of self, it does not attempt to annihilate all individual lives. It mere-
ly opens their closure and leads them to the authenticity of life that lies pre-
cisely in the absence of the distinction between self and other. (2000, 355).  
 
Nietzsche also recognises the fictionality of the metaphysical idea of a 
substantial “subject” behind the appearances of a changing subject: “The 
subject: this is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the differ-
ent impulses of the highest feeling of reality. . . .The subject is the fiction 
that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum” (1967, 
268-69).  
 Decentering the subject or rethinking selfhood or identity does not 
totally negate self, but rather resituates it by undoing the artificial and 
hierarchical distinctions such as mind/body, or self/other. Heidegger, for 
example, talks about Dasein instead of human being or subject. Being-
there (Da-sein) suggests a situational and always particular (jemeinig) 
point of view, without this particularity being subsumed under the Sub-
ject-Object distinction. The idea of Dasein instead of human being is 
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meant to point to the simple fact that we are in the world. Dasein is not 
man as subject, but “that belongingness that, holding unto the ab-ground, 
belongs to the clearing of be-ing” (Heidegger 2006, 286). Elsewhere 
Heidegger talks about how a self is only generated by understanding it 
from its embeddedness in the world first:  
 
Transcendence means to understand oneself from a world. Dasein is as such 
out beyond itself. Only a being to whose ontological constitution tran-
scendence belongs has the possibility of being anything like a self. Tran-
scendence is even the presupposition for Dasein’s having a character of a 
self. The selfhood of Dasein is founded on its transcendence, and Dasein is 
not first an ego-self, which then oversteps something or other. (1982, 300) 
 
We can also see how Heidegger uses the metaphysical language in dif-
ferent ways. Transcendence for him is not some otherworldly thing, it is 
firmly grounded in the world here. Zhuangzi gives us a similar message: 
“Without an Other there is no Self, without Self no choosing one thing 
rather than another” (Graham 2001, 51). The idea of a self or identity is 
not totally denied, but said to arise only as a function of relationality. 
 Similarly, Heidegger’s notion of Ereignis (appropriation, event, 
happening; see Heidegger 1989) suggests thinking beyond the subject-
object dichotomy, in the sense that the subject is always already included 
in the event. The subject belongs to the more primordial event and can 
only be derivatively understood from Ereignis. This idea is similar to the 
idea of dao as interpreted by Hall and Ames in terms of focus and field. 
According to them, dao is way-making (2003). The basic similarity lies in 
the fact that both the notions of Ereignis and dao as way-making make it 
clear that the spotlight is on the focal self as embedded in the world as 
field. Again, er-eignen as appropriating, or dao as way-making, should 
not be read metaphysically as a subject appropriating an object to itself, 
making it its own, or possessing an object. Both Ereignis and dao are bet-
ter understood as processes, referring to both the singular processes of 
entities and the entire process of the world within which humanity be-
longs.  
 As such this leads to the idea that “within the open expanse of un-
concealment each lingering being (weiliges) becomes present to every 
other lingering being” (Heidegger 1975, 47). Any idea of self only arises 
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out of such interdependence or becoming present. The same idea is ex-
pressed in Zhuangzi: “the myriad things and I are one” (Graham 2001, 
56). Not only is it necessary for a self to begin or arise from the other, but 
it is better not to see self and other as detached, since if we focus too much 
on the individual self, we will be too one-sided in our appreciation of the 
multifaceted process called dao. It is also in this sense that we must un-
derstand Zhuangzi’s “The utmost man is selfless” (2001, 45). 
 Again, this reading does not require a denial of identity, person-
hood, or self. Rather it requires a deeper understanding of the self as fun-
damentally relational. This reading does not try to secure or abstract the 
self or its essence from the world of change, as does the traditional meta-
physical interpretation, but seeks instead to locate the self within a world 
of change and arising out of such a world, rather than standing opposed 
to it. 
 
The Pluralist Person 
So, how should such a selfless person be understood? After analyzing 
the characters for self or person and the context in which they are used 
by Zhuangzi, Chris Jochim comes to the conclusion that modern notions 
of self are not applicable to Zhuangzi, and that Zhuangzi’s has a “plural-
istic conception of the person, not a unitary one built concentrically 
around an inner, spiritual core” (1998, 53). This coincides quite closely 
with what continental thinkers have proposed. In Nietzsche’s terms, 
“The assumption of one single subject is perhaps unnecessary; perhaps it 
is just as permissible to assume a multiplicity of subjects, whose interac-
tion and struggle is the basis of our thought and our consciousness in 
general” (1967, 270). Or, as David Hall notes, “The postmodern, plural, 
aesthetic self has an awareness of its plurality and the insistent particu-
larity of the elements that variously focus that plurality. This aesthetic 
self-consciousness rehearses the Taoist vision of no-soul, no-self” (1994, 
232). 
 This leaves us with the relationship between self and other. It would 
be natural to expect that if the self is rather seen in terms of a person em-
bedded within a world, that the relationship between self and other 
would be radically different from that of modern Western metaphysics. 
Zhuangzi speaks of the daemonic man (shenren) whenever he speaks of 
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the person who is no longer as self, but through whom heaven (tian) is 
acting. Graham says that then “the self dissolves, energies strange to him 
and higher than his own (the daemonic) enter from outside, the agent of 
his actions is no longer the man but Heaven working through him” (2001, 
69). Cook Ding says that “nowadays in am in touch through the daemon-
ic in me, and do not look with the eye” (2001, 63). In Heidegger, and to a 
certain extent in Derrida, language speaks through us. 
 Heidegger acknowledges that an Auseinandersetzung or con-
frontation with the other is necessary for any self to become itself, but it 
must be noted that this encounter is not a mere appropriation or incor-
poration of the other. The other as other is not to be overcome in a dialec-
tic way; it is the encounter that matters, so that “The appropriation of 
one’s own is only as the encounter [Auseinandersetzung] and guest-like 
dialogue with the foreign” (1996, 142). The encounter does not presup-
pose two different identities; it is rather that the identities are side effects 
of the more primordial encounter, In Daoism, as Hall and Ames have it, 
 
Spontaneous action is a mirroring response. As such, it is action that ac-
commodates the “other” to whom one is responding. It takes the other on 
its own terms. Such spontaneity involves recognizing the continuity be-
tween oneself and the other, and responding in such a way that one’s own 
actions promote the interests and well-being both of oneself and of the oth-
er. (2003, 24)  
 
 In early Heideggerian terminology, Dasein is always Mitsein (being-
with), and its way of being is Sorge (care). The previously discussed four-
fold (Geviert) of the later Heidegger similarly suggests that we, as mor-
tals, are part of the world in a unity with the heavens, earth and divini-
ties, and thus to care for ourselves we have to care for the world. Such 
thinking is also found in the Daoist sages, who in Daode jing 7 satisfy 
their own needs by being unselfish. We can also see such thinking back 
in chapters 22 and 81. As Hall and Ames note:  
 
In a world where process and change are deemed prior to form and rest, 
there can be little incentive to develop notions of discrete agency. From the 
classical Chinese perspective, agents cannot be decontextualized and su-
perordinated. . . .Agency and action, subject and object, are not contraries, 
but interchangeable aspects of a single category: experience. (1998, 227)  
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Conclusion 
There are many resources in continental philosophy that would make it 
easier to understand classical Daoism and that would be conducive to 
the comparative endeavor of relating different thoughts from vastly dif-
ferent traditions and times to each other. Continental thinkers have given 
us tools to overcome the inherent dualism in most of Western philoso-
phy, using reversal strategies that in the end seek to upset the dualistic 
tendencies.  
 They also show how we could use language differently, important 
for translation strategies and to see how we could understand our place 
as persons in the world. I do not make the claim that there are no other 
vocabularies or ways of thinking that might also be conducive to such 
endeavors, but I do think that the struggle against the metaphysical 
dominance that is apparent in the continental thinkers I have discussed 
is of great use for understanding Daoism as a non-metaphysical way of 
thought. 
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